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Abstract 
The paper addresses the problem of interpreting anaphoric NPs in Modern Greek. It 
includes a proposal of a novel analysis based on the systematic interaction of the neo-
Gricean pragmatic principles of communication, which provides a neat and elegant 
approach to NP-anaphora resolution.  
The findings of this study provide evidence for an account of NP-anaphora in terms of 
the division of labour between syntax and pragmatics and more accurately in terms of the 
systematic interaction of the neo-Gricean pragmatic principles.  
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1. Setting the scene 
 
The interpretation of anaphoric expressions is one of the core issues in linguistics. 
Understanding and explaining the phenomenon of anaphora, as it is termed, which refers 
to the relation between two noun phrases (henceforth NPs), wherein the interpretation of 
the one (the anaphoric expression) is fixed upon the interpretation of the other (the 
antecedent), constitutes one of the most intriguing and controversial topics in linguistic 
research.  
Anaphora is a cross-linguistic phenomenon and it is realised differently across 
languages. To borrow two terms from biology, we can say that on the one hand, there is 
a certain genotype of anaphora, which is common to all natural languages and on the 
other hand, there are various phenotypes, i.e. observable variations in the realisation of 
the phenomenon.  
In this paper I will mainly focus on NP-anaphora in Modern Greek and I will show 
that the established syntactic accounts of the phenomenon cannot adequately describe 
and explain the whole range of anaphoric patterns. I shall present evidence according to 
which NP-anaphora patterns in Modern Greek are inherently pragmatic in nature and 
anaphora resolution involves preferred interpretations following from conversational 
inferences.  Given this, a way forward is to propose that NP-anaphora in Modern Greek 
can be explained more elegantly in terms of the division of labour between syntax and 
pragmatics and more precisely, in terms of the systematic interaction of pragmatic 
principles of communication such as the neo-Gricean pragmatic principles in the spirit of 
Levinson (1991, 2000) and Huang (1994, 2000). 
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 offers an overview of the 
basic distributional facts of NP-anaphora in Modern Greek. In section 3, we present an 
up-to-date review of the generative approaches to Modern Greek NP-anaphora. The 
proposed partial neo-Gricean pragmatic analysis is presented in section 4.  
 
 
2. Some basic facts  
  
In this section, I shall present the basic distributional facts of Modern Greek NP-
anaphora, focusing mainly on the classification and the syntactic distribution of anaphors 
and pronominals (overt and zero).  
 
 
2.1 Typology 
 
For our purposes we are going to follow the typology of NPs as introduced in Chomsky 
(1982, 1986). According to this typology, anaphoric NPs are described and classified in 
terms of two polarized abstract features namely [+/-anaphor] and [+/-pronominal] thus 
giving us four different types of NPs. 
In the case of Modern Greek, NPs can be classified as follows: 
 
                                                  overt                                    empty 
[+anaphor, -pronominal]     o eaftos mu                           NP-trace 
[-anaphor, +pronominal]     aftos/i/o,  ton,tin,to               Pro 
[+anaphor, +pronominal]      ------                                    ?PRO 
[-anaphor,   -pronominal]     r-expressions                        wh-trace/variable 
 
Table 1: Classification of NPs in Modern Greek 
 
In this paper I will mainly focus on the reflexive o eaftos mu which fills the overt 
anaphor position, the personal pronouns (overt and empty) which are described as 
pronominals and finally, the r-expressions which fill the overt [-anaphor, -pronominal] 
position. Note however that there is an anaphoric expression missing from the table, 
namely o iδjos. This is an anaphor of a special type that does not fit neatly into this 
classification; we shall return to the case o iδjos of in our discussion. Finally, PRO1 will 
not be discussed since it is not within the scope of this paper.  
 
 
2.2 The reflexive o eaftos mu  
 
One way of expressing reflexivity is by the reflexive pronoun o eaftos mu (myself). It is 
formed by the definite article o (the) in masculine gender, the noun eaftos (self) and the 
possessive pronoun mu (my) in the appropriate person, number and gender in agreement 
                                               
1 For details on PRO see Iatridou (1993), Karanasios (1989), Philippaki-Warburton (1987), 
Philippaki-Warburton & Catsimali (1999), Terzi (1991, 1993) and Varlokosta (1993, 1994).   
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with its antecedent. The possessive pronoun appears only in genitive case. Moreover, the 
agreement in number between the noun and the possessive is not necessary, for instance, 
(ton eafto-sg tu-sg) and (ton eafto-sg tus-pl).  
As Joseph & Philippaki-Warburton (1987: 79) note, o eaftos mu can occur in various 
positions in the clause, “more specifically in whatever position a noun phrase bearing the 
same syntactic relation can occur”. The reflexive pronoun o eaftos mu can function as an 
object, subject, object of an adjective, passive agent and object of prepositions2 as it is 
illustrated in examples (1) - (5) respectively (for more examples see Joseph & 
Philippaki-Warburton 1987, Holton et al 1997 and Chiou 2010).  
 
1) O   Janis aγapai ton  eafto     tu 
       the John loves   the  self-acc his 
      ‘John loves himself.’ 
 
2) O  eaftos      mu  ftei                   ja   ola 
       the self-nom my  is responsible for  everything 
       ‘Myself is responsible for everything.’ 
 
3) Jati δen ise        kalos  me   ton  eafto      su? 
 why not are-2sg good  with the  self-acc your 
 ‘Why are you not good with yourself?’ 
4) O   Janis  pliγonete  apo  ton  eafto      tu 
 the John   is hurt      by   the  self-acc his 
 ‘John hurts himself.’ 
 
5) O   Janis milai    panda  ja  ton  eafto     tu 
 the John speaks always for the  self-acc his 
 ‘John speaks always for himself.’ 
 
 
2.3 O iδjos 
 
O iδjos is formed by the definite article and the adjective iδjos (same) and it forms all 
three genders in both numbers. It can be found mainly in two positions, namely, in a 
subject or in an object position (direct or indirect). Consider examples (6) and (7) 
respectively. 
 
6) O   Janisi δjavase  to   vivlio  pu   o   iδjosi          ixe  aγorasi 
 the John  read       the  book  that the same-nom had bought 
 ‘John read the book that he himself had bought.’ 
 
                                               
2 Holton et al. (1997) as well as Joseph & Philippaki-Warburton (1987: 80) note that the reflexive 
o eaftos mu does not occur with other locatival complex prepositions, for instance, *dhipla ston 
eafto mu (next to myself), *piso apo ton eafto mu (behind myself) etc. However, expressions 
such as enantia ston eafto mu (against myself), gyro/ekso apo ton eafto mu (round/outside 
myself) may occur. 
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7) O   Janisi  θeli     o    Kostasj  na  voiθisi ton iδjoi 
 the John   wants  the Kostas   to  help    the same-acc 
 ‘John wants Kostas to help him.’  
      
When in object position, o iδjos cannot appear in relative clauses and cannot have a 
quantifier as its antecedent, see (8) and (9). By contrast, subject o iδjos allows for the 
above distributions, see for instance example (6).  
 
8) *O  Janisi aγapai tin  kopela pu  filise      ton iδjoi 
 the John  loves    the  girl    who  kissed  the same-acc 
 ‘John loves the girl who kissed himself.’ 
 
9) *Kaθenasi nomizi oti    o    Janis aγapai  ton iδjoi  
 everyone  thinks  that  the John  loves    the same-acc 
 ‘Everyone thinks that John loves him.’ 
 
 
2.4 Personal pronouns 
 
Personal pronouns occur in both numbers (singular and plural), in all three persons, 
namely, eγo, esi, aftos/afti, emis, esis, afti/aftes (I, you, he/she, we, you, they) and form 
all cases. As Mackridge (1985: 145) notes, “personal pronouns are divided into emphatic 
and non-emphatic (clitic) pronouns” There is a difference between emphatic and non-
emphatic pronouns both in their function and form. More precisely, “the emphatic forms 
are typically disyllabic or trisyllabic and are stressed on the second syllable whereas the 
clitics are unstressed monosyllables” (Mackridge 1985: 145).  Clitic forms function as 
direct or indirect objects and they normally precede the verb forms, except for 
imperatives and the present participles where they follow the verb (Mackridge 1985).  
What is more, given that Modern Greek is a typical pro-drop language, it normally drops 
the overt subject personal pronouns. As a result, the class of pronominals can also appear 
as an empty category. By way of illustration consider the example:  
 
10) Ø          ipe   oti   Ø          θa   δjavazi perisotero  
 (She/he) said that (she/he) will study   more    
 ‘She/he said that she/he will study more.’  
 
As Joseph & Philippaki-Warburton (1987) state, full pronouns are optional in their 
occurrence. Their presence is usually associated with emphasis or contrast and they are 
considered more marked choice when use instead of a zero pronoun (Holton et al. 1997).  
The referential properties of zero pronouns are similar to the overt ones. In addition, null 
subject languages like Modern Greek also exhibit two other properties: a) they have free 
subject inversion, and b) they can extract the subject long-distance over a lexically filled 
complementizer (Huang 2000). 
  
Performing Anaphora in Modern Greek: A Neo-Gricean Pragmatic Analysis 339 
 
11) Sto     sxolio    piγe  o    Janis 
 to the school   went the  John 
 ‘John went to school.’ 
 
12) Pjos  nomizis      oti   irθe   simera spiti? 
who  think-2sg   that came today  home 
‘Who do you think that came home today?’ 
             
In this paper, we are more interested in third person pronouns, either in their full form 
aftos, afti, afto (he, she, it), their non-emphatic or clitic form tu, tis, to or in the zero 
form. 
 
 
3. The syntax of NP-anaphora 
 
The most influential theory which has offered a systematic and principled approach to 
NP-anaphora in Modern Greek has been Chomsky’s binding theory within the 
framework of the principles-and-parameters theory. 
 
 
3.1 Binding principles 
 
Following Chomsky (1982, 1986) the interpretation of lexical anaphors, pronominals 
(overt and zero) and r-expressions is regulated by the three binding principles or 
conditions in (13). 
 
13) Chomsky’s binding principles (Chomsky 1995: 96). 
 Principle A: An anaphor must be bound in a local domain. 
 Principle B: A pronominal must be free in a local domain. 
 Principle C: An r-expression must be free. 
                                                                                                            
The definition of binding is given in (14) below: 
 
14) α binds β iff: 
 i)   α is in an A-position  
 ii)  α c-commands β, and      
            iii)  α and β are coindexed 
 
Note that given (14i), the binding conditions are relevant to NPs occupying θ-marked 
positions which are in principle A(rgument)-positions. Consequently, A-binding is 
distinguished from A’-binding, with the latter being relevant to binding of variables 
which occupy A’-positions. Finally c-command is defined in (15). 
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15) α c-commands β iff: 
 i)   α does not dominate β, 
 ii)  β does not dominate α,  
 iii) the first branching node dominating α also dominates β 
 
C-command distinguishes syntactic binding from co-reference, which is a semantic 
notion.  
Following the above rules and principles, the paradigmatic patterns for binding in 
Modern Greek can be described along the following lines:  The reflexive o eaftos mu3 
appears to be a typical example of a [+anaphor] [-pronominal] NP and thus it should be 
bound by a local antecedent. 
 
16) I    Mariai θavmazi ton eafto tisi 
 the Mary  admires the self   hers 
         ‘Mary admires herself.’ 
 
17) *I    Mariai ipe  oti   o  eaftos tisi  ine kalos sto    piano 
 the  Mary  said that the self  her  is   good  at the piano 
 ‘Mary said that herself is good at playing the piano.’  
 
In (16) o eaftos mu is co-indexed with a local antecedent, which is grammatically 
acceptable whereas in (17) we have an ungrammatical sentence since the reflexive 
appears to receive a non-local antecedent violating thus binding condition A. Therefore, 
the distribution of the Modern Greek reflexive o eaftos mu in examples (16) and (17) 
follows straightforwardly from binding principle A. Moreover, according to principle B, 
a pronominal is free in its local domain. This is borne out in Modern Greek for the 
personal pronouns either overt or zero as it is illustrated in the examples (18) and (19). 
 
18) O   Janisi ipe  oti    Øi  tha  δiavazi perisotero  
 the John  said that (he)   will study   more    
 ‘John said that he will study more.’ 
 
19) *O Janisi toni kseri    poli kala  
 the John  him knows very well     
 ‘John knows him very well.’ 
 
The ungrammaticality of (19) follows from the violation of binding principle B since the 
clinic pronoun ton is co-indexed locally. Finally, in an unmarked context examples like 
(20) are also ungrammatical since they violate binding principle C.  
 
20) *O Janisi θavmazi ton Janii  
 the John  admires the John     
 ‘John admires John.’ 
                                               
3 For the reflexive o eaftos mu see also Iatridou (1988); see also Anagnostopoulou & Everaert 
(1999) for an analysis within the semantic/argument structure approach.   
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3.2 Problematic issues 
 
 
3.2.1 Problems with principles A and B  
 
Cross linguistic evidence has shown that the binding principles run into great difficulties 
in particular with languages that allow the long-distance binding of reflexives/anaphors 
(e.g. the majority of Asian languages, some Scandinavian, Germanic and Romance 
languages), but also with languages that lack reflexives altogether using thus 
pronominals for encoding co-reference locally (e.g. Astronesian and Papuan languages), 
(see Huang 2000 for more).      
In Modern Greek too, there are certain cases which are problematic for the classical 
binding theory. To begin with, the reflexive o eaftos mu is not an exception to long-
distance binding effects. Consider the following example: 
 
21) Ø i      mu   ipe          na  fero    mia  efimeriδa   ja  ton  Janij  ke  
 (He) me  said-3sg  to  bring  one  newspaper for the  John  and  
 mia  ja   ton eafto tui 
 one  for the self   his  
 ‘He told me to bring one newspaper for John and one for himself.’ 
 
In addition, there is the well know case ‘picture’ NPs.  
 
22) O   Nikosi ipe  oti   o   Kostasj iδe mia fotoγrafia tu  eaftu tuj stin   
 the Nick   said that the Kostas saw a    picture      the self his in the 
 efimeriδa 
             newspaper 
            ‘John said that Kostas saw a picture of himself/him in the  newspaper.’ 
  
Examples like (21) and (22) challenge a purely local account of reflexive o eaftos mu. In 
example (21), even if there isn’t a strict violation of binding condition A, since there is 
no c-command relationship, there is an issue for a purely local account of the reflexive as 
it should be accepted that there is another version of o eaftos mu which does not fall 
under binding condition A. Also in (22), the alleged complementarity in reference 
between reflexives and pronominals, arising from the mirror effect of binding conditions 
A and B, breaks down. 
Coming to pronouns, despite the fact that both overt and zero pronouns are subject to 
binding condition B, it has been shown that they are not in free variation. As example 
(23) illustrates, there are cases in which the use of an overt pronoun instead of a zero one 
can change reference, which is not predicted by binding condition B.  
 
23) Kapjosi     ipe  oti    aftosz /Øi    iδe  ti  Mariaj  sto     party 
 somebody said that  he    (he)  saw the Mary at the party 
 ‘Somebody said that he saw Mary at the party.’ 
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3.2.2 The anaphor o iδjos 
 
Particularly worrisome appears to be the case of the anaphoric expression o iδjos4. O 
iδjos does not fit into the binding principles as defined in (13) since it appears to be free 
in its local domain but bound within the sentence, combining therefore properties of both 
anaphors and pronominals. In addition, it systematically overlaps in reference with 
personal pronouns. In the current literature there are two major studies which attempt  to 
address the problem, namely, Iatridou (1986) and Varlokosta & Hornstein (1993) 
(henceforth V&H).  
Iatridou (1986) notes that there is not a principle to cover the option bound in the 
whole sentence but free in the governing category and hence she puts forward a new 
binding principle, namely Principle D, as a complement principle of Principle C.  
 
24) Principle D 
O iδjos should be bound in the whole sentence but free in the governing category. 
  
Moreover, Iatridou (1986) distinguishes between anaphoric and adjectival uses of o iδjos 
in order to account for cases where Principle D appears to be violated. 
Coming next to Varlokosta & Hornstein (1993), they note that o iδjos is or behaves 
like a pronominal since it has to be free in its local domain. Nevertheless, o iδjos, unlike 
the other pronouns in Modern Greek, has to be bound within its own sentence. This leads 
V&H to conclude (as Iatridou 1986 does) that o iδjos does not fit neatly into the standard 
binding principles. More specifically, they suggest that when in object position o iδjos is 
an A’-bound pronoun (see also Enç 1989 for a similar approach). Their analysis is based 
on Koopman & Sportiche’s (1989) work of on logophoric pronouns. By generalizing 
Koopman & Sportiche’s analysis, V&H propose that in the [Spec, CP] there is a null 
operator (Ø) which A’-binds o iδjos. As for o iδjos in subject positions they suggest that 
syntactically “it has none of the properties of object o iδjos since it functions like a 
standard pronominal expression and it has a focused reading” (V&H 1993: 188). 
Therefore, they propose that the “pronoun found in subject position is IΔJOS rather than 
iδjos…”.  
However, these two approaches are not without problems. To begin with Iatridou 
(1986), Principle D appears to receive support from the case of o iδjos in Modern Greek 
and from a class of long-distance reflexives, which do not take a local, like in Marathi 
and Dravidian languages. Yet, it cannot be maintained as a cross-language principle. 
This is due to the fact that in most of the cases, long-distance anaphors like o iδjos allow 
local binding as well (like Chinese zijii, see Huang (1994, 2000). What is more, even the 
prediction that o iδjos should be bound in its sentence is falsified by examples like the 
following: 
  
                                               
4 Zribi-Hertz (1995) and Kiparsky (2002) also discuss, rather briefly though, o iδjos in their works. 
There are also two studies within the framework of Lexical Functional Grammar (LFG) by 
Kordoni (1995) and Lapata (1998), which will be not considered here. 
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25) O   Janisi ipe   oti    piγe         me    ti  Maria             
 the John   said  that  went-3sin  with  the Mary-acc  
 exθes      sto     aeroδromio. Otan eftasan         ston    elenxo  
 yesterday at the airport.        When arrived-3pl to the control 
 o    ipalilos rotise  an θa  taksiδepsi    ke  o iδjosi 
 the officer  asked   if  will travel-3sin and the same 
   ‘John said that he went to the airport with Mary yesterday. When   
    they reached the control the employee at the desk asked if he himself   
    is going to travel.’ 
 
In V&H (1993), the basic distributional and configurational facts of o iδjos follow from 
the properties of bound pronouns. The major advantage of this approach is that it 
describes more accurately the pronominal features of o iδjos. On the one hand, this 
approach partly explains the distributional overlap between o iδjos and the clitic pronoun 
ton, which supports further the pronominal aspect of the former. On the other hand, their 
difference in dependency is given by the Ø-operator binding of o iδjos. However, it is 
not always unacceptable to find o iδjos bound where the presence of an Ø-operator is not 
possible. Embedded questions like the one in (26) can falsify the prediction proposed in 
this analysis. Consider the following example which is judged acceptable by native 
speakers. 
 
26) O  ipurγosi  δen ipe  pjos  ixe   katiγorisi tote ton iδjoi 
  the minister not told who had  accused   then the same self   
  ‘The minister didn’t tell who had accused him then.’ 
 
In this case, o iδjos seems to be bound directly by its antecedent without the need of an 
Ø-operator. According to V&H (1993) sentence (26) is ungrammatical as the SpecCP 
position is occupied by the wh-word pjos and consequently there is no position for the 
Ø-operator. 
 
 
3.3.3 Discussion 
 
From the discussion so far it follows that syntactic factors play a central role in Modern 
Greek NP-anaphora. Nevertheless, a closer examination also reveals a number of cases 
which reinforce the view that the interpretation of Modern Greek NP-anaphora has been 
‘over-grammaticized’, to borrow Levinson’s (1987) phrasing. In other words, there are 
several cases that cannot be adequately described and explained within a purely syntactic 
account.  In a nutshell, classical binding theory cannot account for the long-distance uses 
of the reflexive o eaftos mu and it cannot provide an explanation for the differences in 
interpretation between an overt and a zero pronoun. Furthermore, there have been 
attempts to come up with better formulations for o iδjos, nevertheless, purely syntactic 
accounts remain problematic when it comes to the interpretation as well as to the 
systematic overlap in reference of o iδjos with personal pronouns.   
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4. The neo-Gricean pragmatic theory  
 
As shown, there is enough evidence against a purely syntactic account of NP-anaphora 
in Modern Greek (as well as across languages for that matter). Many considerations have 
been put forward, even within syntactic literature, suggesting that anaphora is a multi-
dimensional phenomenon, integrating semantic, pragmatic (see Reinhart 19835) and 
discourse aspects (see Fox 1987, Frey 2005). Earlier attempts to provide a partially 
pragmatic account of anaphora phenomena has also been pursued in the works of Dowty 
(1980), Mittwoch (1983), Kempson (1984, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c), Kuno (1987) and 
Grodzinsky & Reinhart (1993). 
 
 
4.1 Neo-Gricean pragmatic principles of communication  
 
The Gricean construal of meaning and communication is founded upon two basic 
theories, namely the theory of meaningnn (non-natural meaning) and the theory of 
conversational implicatures (see Grice 1975, 1989). In both theories, Grice attempts to 
show the importance of non-conventional means in communication but also he draws the 
line between what is said and what is actually communicated in a communicative event. 
    
 
4.1.1 Levinson’s inferential principles 
 
A recent development of the original Gricean theory on communication is the neo-
Gricean pragmatic theory introduced and developed by Levinson (1987, 1991, 1998, 
2000). Levinson suggests that the classical Gricean maxims of conversation be reduced 
to three pragmatic principles, namely, the Q- (Quantity), I- (Informativeness), and M- 
(Manner) principles which are defined as follows: 
 
27) The Q-Principle 
Speaker’s Maxim:  
Do not provide a statement that is informationally weaker than your knowledge of the 
world allows, unless providing a stronger statement would contravene the I-principle. 
Recipient’s corollary:  
Take it that the speaker made the strongest statement consistent with what he knows, and 
therefore that: 
a) If the speaker asserted A(W), and  <S, W> form a Horn scale (such that A(S) – 
A(W)), then one can infer K ~ (A(S)), i.e. that the speaker knows that the 
strongest statement will be false; 
                                               
5 Reinhart (1983) argues for the distinction between co-reference, which is 
semantically/pragmatically determined and bound anaphora which is grammatically conditioned 
and constrained by c-command. For cases that don’t fall under the bound variable constructions, 
Reinhart (1983: 167) puts forward the following maxim of Manner: “Be as explicit as 
conditions permit” i.e. by avoiding a bound variable interpretation the speaker intends non-co-
reference between the relevant expressions.  
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b) If the speaker asserted A(W) and A(W) fails to entail an embedded sentence Q, 
which a stronger statement A(S) would entail, and {S, W} form a contrast set, 
then one can infer ~K(Q), i.e. the speaker does not know whether  Q obtains or 
not. 
 
The basic idea of the Q-principle is that the use of an expression (especially a 
semantically weaker one) in a set of contrastive semantic alternates (such as a Horn-
scale) Q-implicates the negation of the interpretation associated with the use of another 
expression (especially a semantically stronger one) in the same set. Seen the other way 
round, from the absence of an informationally stronger expression, we infer that the 
interpretation associated with the use of that expression does not hold. Hence, the Q-
principle is essentially negative in nature. The operation of the Q-principle is illustrated 
in (28). 
 
28) Some of John’s students are hard-working. 
           +> Not all of John’s students are hard-working 
 
29) The I-Principle 
Speaker’s Maxim: The Maxim of Minimization. 
‘Say as little as necessary’, i.e. produce the minimal linguistic information sufficient to 
achieve your communicational ends (bearing the Q-principle in mind). 
Recipient’s corollary: The enrichment rule. 
Amplify the informational content of the speaker’s utterance, by finding the most 
specific interpretation, up to what you judge to be the speaker’s m-intended point. 
Specifically: 
a) Assume that stereotypical relations obtain between referents or events, unless 
(i) this is inconsistent with what is taken for granted; (ii) the speaker has broken 
the Maxim of Minimization by choosing a prolix expression. 
b) Assume the existence of actuality of what a sentence is ‘about’ if that is 
consistent with what is taken for granted. 
c) Avoid interpretations that multiply entities referred to (assume referential 
parsimony); specifically, prefer co-referential readings of reduced NP’s 
(pronouns or zero). 
 
Mirroring the effects of the Q-principle, the central tenet of the I-principle is that the use 
of a semantically general expression I-implicates a semantically specific interpretation. 
More accurately, the implicature engendered by the I-principle is one that accords best 
with the most stereotypical and explanatory expectation given our knowledge about the 
world. By way of illustration, take (30). 
 
30) Paul was waiting for the nurse to give him his medicine 
           +> Paul was waiting for the female nurse to give him his medicine 
 
In this case an I-implicature is triggered by the stereotypically held expectation that a 
nurse is most of the times a female.  
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31) M-Principle 
Speaker’s Maxim:  
Don’t use a prolix, obscure or marked expression without reason. 
Recipient’s Corollary:  
If the speaker used a prolix or marked expression M, he or she did not mean the same as 
he or she would have had he or she used the unmarked expression U-specifically he or 
she was trying to avoid the stereotypical associations and I-implicatures of U. 
Unlike the Q- and I-principles, which operate primarily in terms of semantic 
informativeness, the metalinguistic M-principle6 is operative primarily in terms of a set 
of alternates that contrast in form. The fundamental axiom upon which this principle 
rests is that the use of a marked or prolix7 expression M-implicates the negation of the 
interpretation associated with the use of an alternative, unmarked expression in the same 
set. 
 
32) The new manager is friendly. 
 I +> The new manager is friendly in the stereotypical sense 
 The new manager is not unfriendly 
 M +> The new manager is less friendly than the previous utterance suggests 
 
Given the above tripartite classification of neo-Gricean pragmatic principles, the 
question that arises next is how inconsistencies arising from these potentially conflicting 
implicatures can be resolved. According to Levinson (2000), they can be resolved by an 
ordered set of precedence. 
 
33) Levinson's resolution schema for the interaction 
 of the Q-, I-, and M-principles 
a) Level of genus: Q > M > I 
b) Level of species: e.g. Q-clausal > Q-scalar 
 
Genuine Q-implicatures (where Q-clausal cancels rival Q-scalar) precede inconsistent I-
implicatures, but otherwise I-implicatures take precedence until the use of a marked 
linguistic expression triggers a complementary M-implicature to the negation of the 
applicability of the pertinent I-implicature (see e.g. Huang 2007 for further discussion).  
  
                                               
6 The Levinsonian Manner principle is directly related to the Gricean maxim of Manner and more 
precisely to the submaxims ‘avoid obscurity of expression’ and ‘avoid prolixity’ (see Grice 
1989).  
7 The notion of markedness employed for the M-principle is in the spirit of Horn (1989) and 
Levinson (1987, 2000). In terms of formal characteristics, marked forms, in comparison to 
corresponding unmarked forms, are more morphologically complex and less lexicalized, more 
prolix and periphrastic, less frequent or usual, and less neutral in register. (Levinson 2000: 137). 
For a discussion on the different senses of ‘markedness’ and the possibility of doing away with 
it see Haspelmath (2006).   
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4.1.2 A revised neo-Gricean pragmatic apparatus 
 
Based on the theoretical framework above, Levinson (1987, 1991) puts forward the 
hypothesis that the three Binding Conditions of generative grammar can be reduced to a 
single grammatical condition with the effects of the other two being secured by default 
pragmatic inferences following from the systematic interaction of the I-, Q- and M- 
pragmatic principles. This idea is further pursued in Huang (2000, 2007) and a revised 
neo-Gricean pragmatic apparatus for the interpretation of anaphora is fleshed out. 
  
A revised neo-Gricean pragmatic apparatus for anaphora: 
a) Interpretation principles 
i) The use of an anaphoric expression x will I-implicate a co-referential 
interpretation unless (ii) or (iii). 
ii) There is an anaphoric Q-scale <x, y>, in which case, the use of y will Q-
implicate the complement of the I-implicature associated with the use of x 
in terms of either reference. 
iii) There is an anaphoric M-scale {x, y}, in which case, the use of y M-
implicates the complement of the I-implicature associated with the use of 
x, in terms of either reference or expectedness i.e. 
(contrastiveness/emphaticness or logophoricity). 
b) Consistency constraints 
Any interpretation implicated by (i) above is subject to the requirement of consistency 
with:  
i) Information saliency, so that  
a) implicatures due to matrix constructions may take precedence 
over implicatures due to subordinate constructions, and  
b) implicatures to co-reference may be preferred according to the 
saliency of antecedent in line with the hierarchy: topic> 
subject> object, etc.; and 
ii) General implicature constraints, namely, 
c) background assumptions, 
d) contextual factors 
e) meaning-nn, and 
f) semantic entailments. 
 
35) Referential content hierarchy 
           Anaphors < pronominals < r-expressions 
             
Given (35), a choice to the left tends to reinforce co-referential readings, while a choice 
to the right tends to reinforce disjoint reference.  
 
 
5. A partial neo-Gricean pragmatic analysis for Modern Greek  
 
In the remaining of this paper I shall present a partial neo-Gricean pragmatic analysis of 
NP-anaphora in Modern Greek, seeking evidence for Levinson’s and Huang’s revised 
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neo-Gricean pragmatic theory of anaphora as presented in the previous section8. More 
precisely, I shall argue for a partial pragmatic reduction of the interpretation of Modern 
Greek NP-anaphora based on the systematic interaction of the Q- I- and M-neo-Gricean 
pragmatic principles. The proposed pragmatic model is not a wholesale replacement of 
syntactic accounts. By contrast, it presupposes the existence of distinct syntactic, 
semantic and pragmatic levels of explanation. For this matter, the account proposed 
points in the direction of a division of labour between syntax and pragmatics. 
 
 
5.1 The reflexive o eaftos mu  
 
As we have seen so far, the reflexive o eaftos mu may be used as: a) a locally bound 
reflexive or b) a long-distance anaphor. Let us examine these two cases separately.  
In typical reflexive constructions like the one in (36) below, o eaftos mu is bound by 
a local antecedent and it behaves as its English equivalent, namely, himself.   
 
36) I    Mariai θavmazi ton eafto tisi 
 the Mary  admires the self   hers 
 ‘Mary admires herself.’ 
 
In these distributions, reflexive o eaftos mu behaves like a typical [+anaphor, -
pronominal] NP in the sense of Chomsky (1982, 1986). Its interpretation is syntactically 
and semantically conditioned and it does not depend on contextual factors. For that 
matter we accept that local co-referential relationships are grammatically conditioned in 
Modern Greek and are interpreted by the syntactically defined binding principle A.  
Given the formulation above, wherever a pronoun (semantically weak) is used 
instead of the reflexive o eaftos mu (semantically strong) the interpretation of the 
pronoun would be pragmatically inferred as follows:   
 
37) I    Mariai tinz θavmazi   
 the Mary  her admires   
 ‘Mary admires her.’ 
 
The reflexive o eaftos mu and the pronoun will form a Q-scale <o eaftos mu, tin>. In 
(36) reflexivity is overtly marked in the syntax by the use of the reflexive o eaftos mu, 
hence according to binding condition A, the use of the reflexive will give rise to a local 
co-referential interpretation. When the speaker alters to a clitic pronoun, as in (37), 
she/he invites the hearer to infer that she/he intends to avoid the local co-referential 
interpretation. Given that o eaftos mu is semantically stronger than the pronoun, the 
choice of the semantically weaker clitic pronoun will Q-implicate the complement of the 
                                               
8 See also Valiouli (1994) for a more discourse oriented pragmatic analysis of the phenomenon of 
anaphora, Miltsakaki (2002) and Karamanis & Miltsakaki (2006) for an anaphora model that 
combines the mechanisms of topic continuity and focusing. For a pragmatic approach to Spanish 
NP-anaphora see Blackwell (1994, 2000, 2001, 2003). 
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interpretation associated with the use of the reflexive, i.e. disjoint reference. Therefore, 
binding principle B effect is pragmatically reduced by the operation of the Q-principle. 
So far so good then for cases where reflexives and pronouns contrast in reference. 
What happens though in cases where this apparent complementarity breaks down like in 
(21) or (38)?  
 
38) O   Janisi iδe mia  fotoγrafia tui/z / tu eaftu tui  sto     perioδiko 
        the John  saw a   picture     him / the self  his  in the magazine 
       ‘John saw a picture of him/himself in the magazine.’ 
  
These distributions embarrass a purely syntactic account that predicts strict 
complementarity of pronouns and anaphors. Nevertheless, a pragmatic analysis is not 
defeated in such a way since it appears that the use of a reflexive in such environments is 
clearly pragmatic and it is different from its local reflexive use. More precisely, it has 
been proposed (see Runner, Sussman & Tanenhaus 2003) that reflexives in ‘picture 
NPs’, appear to behave as logophors (we will return to logophoricity in a while). 
Furthermore, Levinson (2000: 327) notes that “pragmatic contrasts can be on various 
dimensions, and where an anaphor encodes perspectival information as well as 
referential dependency, the contrast with a pronoun can as well be in terms of the 
logophoric dimension”. 
As a result, when the reflexive o eaftos mu is used in these long-distance 
environments, the use of a pronoun still generates a contrast yet because the reflexive is 
marked for other kinds of pragmatic meaning as well (e.g. logophoricity), the contrast is 
at a this very level of logophoricity. Therefore the account can be spelled out as follows: 
The use of the unmarked pronoun indicates that the speaker wants to go for a co-
referential reading. Reversion to the more marked reflexive o eaftos mu, will generate an 
M-implicature in terms of logophoricity. 
 
 
5.3 Overt and zero pronouns 
 
Modern Greek is a typical pro-drop language and as a result, it normally drops the overt 
subject9 of clauses (pro-drop parameter)10. Nevertheless, since pro-dropping is only a 
general tendency, it means that an overt phrase can equally occupy the relevant slot in 
the clause. Let us concentrate here in cases where the full pronoun aftos is used instead 
of a zero pronoun.  
On this basis there is a rather clear question to be addressed to, namely, what is the 
reason for using the pronoun aftos where a non-morphologically expressed pronoun can 
be used. In other words, what motivates speakers to use a marked construction (aftos) 
over an unmarked one (zero)?  There are good reasons to believe that the preference of 
the pronoun aftos over the zero pronoun is inherently pragmatic. In other words, it will 
be claimed that speakers generally tend to avoid using the full pronoun aftos or the 
anaphor o iδjos without any particular purpose. By contrast, when they opt for one of 
                                               
9   Modern Greek drops only subjects but not objects. 
10 The zero subject of finite clauses is known under the term pro, hence the pro-drop parameter. 
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these two marked anaphoric expressions they intend to convey readings which cannot be 
inferred by the use of a zero pronoun.  
The distribution zero/aftos is a twofold case. On the one hand, there are contexts in 
which the use of the more marked aftos, where the zero could have occurred, results in 
the disjoint interpretation of the overt pronoun like in (39). 
 
39) Kapjosi       ipe   oti    Øi /aftosy iδe   ti  Mariaz sto parti 
            somebody said that (he)/he      saw the Mary at the party 
            ‘Somebody said that he saw Mary at the party.’ 
 
On the other hand, there are cases where there is an overlap in reference between the 
zero pronoun and aftos.  
 
40) O  Janisi pistevi oti   Øi /aftosi θa  kerδisi stis ekloγes 
            the John believs that (he)/he    will win    at the elections 
            ‘John believes that he will win at the elections.’ 
 
As mentioned before, these cases are not problematic at all for the neo-Gricean 
pragmatic apparatus since the M-principle operate at various distinct levels of pragmatic 
meaning. As a result, examples like (39) and (40) are interpreted in the following way: 
When a zero pronoun is used co-reference is given by the I-principle. In the case of (39), 
reversion to a more marked full pronoun, will M-implicate a contrast in reference. By 
contrast, in (40) the use of aftos expresses a more emphatic/contrastive meaning. 
Therefore, in contexts like these, the use of the more marked full pronoun M-implicates 
emphaticness/contrastiveness in the following way. Given the set of alternates {Ø, 
aftos}, the choice of the more prolix pronoun instead of the zero will M-implicate the 
intention of the speaker to go for a more marked interpretation in terms of emphasis and 
contrast. 
The observation that there is a general tendency to avoid marked forms, unless there 
is a reason to do so, is not novel in the literature. Chomsky (1981, 1982) has proposed 
the so called ‘avoid pronoun principle’ according to which, a null pronoun is preferred 
where co-reference is intended. In a different case, the use of an overt pronoun would be 
interpreted as disjoint in reference. This principle indeed describes and explains the 
rationale behind the preference of a zero where the option between a null versus a full 
pronoun in pro-drop languages like Modern Greek is open. Yet, this principle has a clear 
pragmatic content and it can follow directly from the interaction of the neo-Gricean 
pragmatic principles as described above.  
 
 
5.4 On the interpretation of o iδjos            
 
As already mentioned, o iδjos overlaps systematically in reference with personal 
pronouns. At the risk of redundancy, consider the following example: 
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41) O   Janisi nomizi oti    Øi    /o iδjosi     ine kalos maθitis  
 the John  thinks  that (he) the same is   good  student  
 ‘John thinks that he is a good student.’ 
 
In these contexts, there is some sort of unexpectedness (Edmondson & Plank 1978, 
Huang 2000, Levinson 2000) in the sense that the preferred interpretational pattern is not 
affected by the use of o iδjos instead of the pronominal form. As Huang (2000: 225) 
notes, “this unexpectedness may turn out to be logophoricity, 
emphaticness/contrastiveness or something yet to be discovered”. 
 
 
5.4.1 Emphaticness/contrastiveness 
 
Modern Greek does not codify emphasis and contrast with purpose-specific pronouns. 
Emphaticness/contrastiveness is mainly expressed by the use of the anaphor o iδjos and 
full pronouns. It is fairly clear from examples like (41) that o iδjos marks 
contrastive/emphatic content which is also accompanied by a natural negative gloss of 
the sort ‘and not anyone else’.  
This sensitivity of o iδjos in emphatic/contrastive interpretations may also be related 
to the semantics of the iδjos (same) part of the anaphoric expression. It could be argued 
that the use of o iδjos generates identity statements (see Alrenga 2006, 2007) and that its 
anaphoric occurances are rather conventionalised as such. This suggestion further 
supports the view that the interpretation of o iδjos is semantically and pragmatically 
motivated. What is more, in this way we can by-pass the problem raised in Iatridou 
(1988), where the syntactic Principle D could only account for the anaphoric uses of o 
iδjos.  
           
 
5.4.2 Logophoricity  
 
Logophoricity and the use of logophoric pronouns were initially observed in a number of 
African languages such as Ewe, Dogon, Tuburi, Aghem and so on (see Huang 2000 for a 
variety of examples). In these languages, there is a separate paradigm of logophoric 
pronouns, i.e. a class of pronouns dedicated to the encoding of logophoric 
interpretations. Nevertheless, apart from the purpose-specific logophoric pronouns, 
reflexives can be used logophorically under certain conditions (see Culy 1994, 1997, 
Huang 1991, 1994, 2000, Sells 1987, Zribi-Hertz 1989).   
According to Culy (1997: 845), “logophoric pronouns are usually described as 
pronouns that are used to refer to the person whose speech, thoughts, or feelings are 
reported or reflected in a given linguistic context”. This ‘person’ is also referred to as the 
‘internal protagonist’ (Huang 2000) or the ‘minimal subject of consciousness’ (Zribi-
Hertz 1989). In particular, Zribi-Hertz (1989) identifies the subject of consciousness 
with Kuno’s (1987) sense of logophoricity as “a semantic property assigned to a referent 
whose thoughts or feelings, optionally expressed in speech, are conveyed by a portion of 
the discourse” (Zribi-Hertz 1989: 711). Logophoricity is also related with the notion of 
‘point of view’, yet Culy (1997) claims that logophoricity proper is rather distinct form 
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point of view. More precisely, Culy points out that “morphologically distinct logophoric 
pronouns are grammatically licensed in indirect discourse…and only secondarily 
indicate point of view” (Culy 1997: 846). In a similar fashion, ‘indirect reflexives’ 
(reflexives which can be used logophorically) “can express point of view if they do not 
have grammatically determined antecedents” (Culy 1997: 856).  
As Kuno (1987) and Kuno & Kaburaki (1977) note, the contrast between a pronoun 
and an anaphor, where there is a free choice, is semantic/pragmatic in nature and it is 
associated with the notion of ‘point of view’. This seems to be the case with Modern 
Greek o iδjos when it occurs in embedded subject positions instead of a zero pronoun 
(see again example 41). A way forward is to suggest that o iδjos, apart from emphasis 
and contrast, also encodes logophoricity in the sense of Kuno (1987) and Kuno & 
Kaburaki (1977). The logophoric interpretation of the sentence can be analyzed as 
follows: When the null pronoun is used, the belief that John is a good student is 
expressed by the speaker. In other words, the speaker states his own view about the 
protagonist of the sentence who is John. By contrast, when o iδjos is used, the sentence 
conveys a more logophoric interpretation in the sense that the internal protagonist’s point 
of view is also expressed. As we understand it, the use of the anaphor o iδjos is 
logophoric. 
The logophoric interpretation of o iδjos can be accounted for by the systematic 
interaction of the neo-Gricean pragmatic principles. When there is an option between a 
zero pronoun and o iδjos, the speaker will tend to use the unmarked zero if a marked 
message is not intended. By contrast, if a logophoric interpretation is intended, the more 
marked o iδjos will be used. This is explained in terms of the interaction of the M- and I-
principles. Given the M-scale <Ø, o iδjos>, the use of the more prolix anaphor, instead 
of the unmarked zero, will M-implicate the intention of the speaker to go for a 
logophoric interpretation.  
     
 
5.5 Parameters constraining anaphora 
 
As it is already mentioned, various syntactic, pragmatic, semantic and cognitive 
parameters appear to interact systematically in the case of anaphora resolution. It has 
been shown (Huang 1991, 1994, 2000, Blackwell 1994, 2000, 2001, 2003) that the 
predictions made by the neo-Gricean pragmatic principles are constrained inconsistent 
with certain factors such as world knowledge, semantic entailments or information 
saliency/aboutness. 
Interpretations that follow from the systematic interaction of the neo-Gricean 
pragmatic principles do not survive when inconsistent with our knowledge of the world. 
By way of illustration, consider the examples. 
              
42) O   kaθighitisi ipe  oti   o    Janisj kseri    oti   Øj  /o iδjosj    perase     
 the professor said that the John knows that (he) /the same passed 
 to δiaγonisma 
 the exam 
 ‘The professor said that John knows that he passed the exam. 
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The M-implicature which should have been generated by the use of the more prolix 
anaphoric expression o iδjos is ruled out since our knowledge about the world is that 
students participate in and pass/fail exams. World knowledge in these cases equals to 
certain stereotypical relations about the world.   
In a study on Spanish NP anaphora Blackwell (1994, 2000) also observes that 
semantic entailments can override inconsistent M-implicatures of non-co-reference.  In 
her example (Blackwell 2001: 929) the use of a more prolix NP, where a zero could have 
occurred, does not trigger an M-inference of non-co-reference. This is also borne out in 
Modern Greek. 
 
43) I    Mariai niazete mono ji’    aftini  ke   panda   kani  to  δiko tis  
            the Mary  cares    only   about her  and always  does the own hers 
            ‘Mary cares only about her and always she does whatever she wants.’ 
  
44) I     Mariai niazete mono ja     ti Mariai  ke   panda   kani  to  δiko tis the Mary 
cares   only   about the Mary and always does the own  hers 
           ‘Mary cares only about Mary and always she does whatever she   
            wants.’ 
 
As the M-principle predicts, the use of the more prolix NP ti Maria where the less prolix 
pronoun could have used, should M-implicate a non-co-referential interpretation. 
However, there is a preference for the co-referential reading of the r-expression which 
can be attributed to semantic entailment. In that case, as Blackwell explains, the M-
implicature is cancelled since the NP ti Maria “is interpreted as a reiterated NP”, that is, 
semantically entailed by the subject NP (Blackwell 2001: 930).  
The theory of antecedent saliency can be proved to be an important factor in Modern 
Greek anaphoric patterns. One can claim that the interpretation of the null pronouns is 
also regulated by ‘aboutness’ factors since it is usually the case that a null pronoun is co-
referential with the most prominent entity in the sentence. Consider the example. 
 
45) O   Janisi xorise me  ti   Mariaj. Kanis    δen kseri     Øi     
 the John  split   with the Mary. Nobody not knows (he)  
 ti     kani meta apo afto 
            what does after      this 
           ‘John split with Mary. Nobody knows how he is coping after that.’ 
 
In (45) the null pronoun can potentially be co-referential with either of NPs in the first 
sentence. However, the most preferred reading is the one shown in the example above. 
In that case John is the topic in discourse, hence more salient than Mary; as a result the 
hearer I-infers that the speaker gives him/her information about the topic of the discourse 
which is John. Note here that any change in the topic would be marked by the use of the 
more prolix full pronoun as (46) illustrates. 
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46) O   Janisi xorise me  ti   Mariaj. Kanis    δen kseri    aftij   
 the John  split   with the Mary. Nobody not knows she  
 ti      kani meta apo afto 
            what does after    this 
             ‘John split with Mary. Nobody knows how she is coping after that.’ 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I addressed the issue of interpreting anaphoric NPs in Modern Greek and I 
proposed an alternative analysis based on the systematic interaction of the neo-Gricean 
pragmatic principles of communication, which provides a neat and more elegant 
approach to NP-anaphora resolution. Summarising our main findings, it was claimed that 
the interpretation of the anaphor o eaftos mu remains grammatically specified and it is 
subject to binding condition A. Yet, in those contexts in which o eaftos mu can receive a 
long distance antecedent a co-referential reading is given by the I-principle. Moreover, 
the use of o idhios instead of a null pronoun will give a preferred contrastive/emphatic 
and/or logophoric interpretation given the M-principle. Also, in the distributions zero vs. 
overt pronoun, preferred interpretations are given by the M-principle. In these cases M-
inferences can give either a disjoint or a contrastive/emphatic reading depending on the 
context. Finally it was shown that interpretations that follow from the systematic 
interaction of the neo-Gricean pragmatic principles do not survive when inconsistent 
with our knowledge of the world. 
The findings of this study provide evidence for an account of NP-anaphora in terms 
of the division of labour between syntax and pragmatics and more accurately in terms of 
the systematic interaction of the neo-Gricean pragmatic principles. Despite the fact that 
syntax and pragmatics operate on distinct levels of linguistic explanation they appear to 
interact systematically in the case of anaphora resolution. On the one hand, syntax sets 
certain restrictions on distributions and regulates the part of interpretations, which are 
related to grammatical structure. On the other hand, the choice of anaphoric expressions 
by the speakers and their interpretation by addressees is heavily dependent on 
preference, which is regulated by principles of language use and communication. 
 
 
References  
 
Anagnostopoulou, Elena and Everaert, Martin. 1999. “Towards a more complete 
typology of anaphoric expressions.” Linguistic Inquiry 30: 97-119. 
Arlenga, Peter. 2006. “Scalar (non-) identity and similarity.” In Proceedings of the 25th 
West Coast Conference on Formal Linguistics (WCCFL 25).  
Arlenga, Peter. 2007. “Types, tokens and identity.” In Proceedings of the 38th Meeting of 
the North East Linguistic Society (NELS 38). 
Edmondson, Jerold and Plank, Frank. 1978. “Great expectations: An intensive self 
analysis.” Linguistics and Philosophy 2: 373-413. 
Blackwell, Sarah E. 1994. A neo-Gricean approach to Spanish NP-anaphora. Ph.D. 
dissertation: University of Pittsburgh.  
Performing Anaphora in Modern Greek: A Neo-Gricean Pragmatic Analysis 355 
 
Blackwell, Sarah E. 2000. “Anaphora interpretations in Spanish utterances and the neo-
Gricean pragmatic theory.” Journal of Pragmatics 32: 389-424. 
Blackwell, Sarah E. 2001. “Testing the neo-Gricean pragmatic theory of anaphora: The 
influence of consistency constraints on interpretations of coreference in Spanish.”  
Journal of Pragmatics 33: 901-941. 
Blackwell, Sarah E. 2003. Implicatures in discourse: The case of Spanish NP-anaphora. 
Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Chiou, Michael. 2010. NP-anaphora in Modern Greek: A neo-Gricean pragmatic 
approach. Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing  
Chomsky, Noam.  1981. Lectures on Government and Binding. Dordrecht: Foris. 
Chomsky, Noam. 1982. Some Concepts and Consequences of the Theory of Government 
and Binding. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. 
Chomsky, Noam. 1986. Knowledge of Language, its Nature, Origin and Use. New 
York: Praeger. 
Chomsky, Noam. 1995. The Minimalist Program. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. 
Culy, Christopher. 1994. “Aspects of logophoric marking.” Linguistics 32: 1055-1094. 
Culy, Christopher. 1997. “Logophoric pronouns and point of view.” Linguistics 35: 845-
859. 
Dowty, David. 1980. “Comments on the paper by Bach and Partee.” In Papers from the 
parasession on pronouns and anaphora, Kreiman, J. & Ojeda, E. A. (eds), 29-40. 
Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society. 
Fox, Barbara. 1987. Discourse Structure and Anaphora. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Frey, Werner. 2005. “Pragmatic properties of certain German and English left peripheral 
constructions.” Linguistics 43 (1): 89-129. 
Grice, Paul. 1975. “Logic and Conversation.” In Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Acts, 
Cole Peter and J. L. Morgan (eds), 41-58. New York: Academic Press. 
Grice, Paul. 1982. “Meaning Revisited.” In Mutual Knowledge, N. V. Smith (eds), 223-
243. New York: Academic Press. 
Grice, Paul. 1989. Studies in the Way of Words: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Grodzinsky, Yosef and Reinhart, Tanya. 1993. “The innateness of binding and 
coreference.” Linguistic Inquiry 24: 69-101. 
Haspelmath, Martin. 2006. “Against markedness (and what to replace it with).” Journal 
of Linguistics 42: 25-70. 
Holton, David, Mackridge, Peter and Philippaki-Warburton, Irene, 1997. Greek: A 
Comprehensive Grammar of the Modern Language. London: Routledge. 
Horn, Laurence. 1989. A Natural History of Negation. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
Huang, Yan. 1991. “A neo-Gricean Pragmatic Theory of Anaphora.” Journal of 
Linguistics 27: 301-333. 
Huang, Yan. 1994. The Syntax and Pragmatics of Anaphora: A Study with special 
reference to Chinese. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Huang, Yan. 2000. Anaphora: A Cross Linguistic Study. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
356 Michael Chiou 
 
Huang, Yan, 2004. “Anaphora and the pragmatics – syntax interface.” In Handbook of 
pragmatics, Laurence R. Horn and George Ward (eds), 288-314. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Huang, Yan. 2007. Pragmatics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Iatridou, Sabine. 1986. “An anaphor not bound in its category.” Linguistic Inquiry 17: 
766-772. 
Iatridou, Sabine. 1988. “Clitics, anaphors and the problem of co-indexation.” Linguistic 
Inquiry 19: 698-703. 
Iatridou, Sabine, 1993. “On nominative case assignment and a few related things.” MIT 
Working Papers in Linguistics 19: Papers on Case and Agreement II. 175-195.  
Joseph, Brian D. and Philippaki-Warburton, Irene. 1987. Modern Greek. London: Croom 
Helm. 
Karamanis, Nikiforos and Miltsakaki, Eleni. 2006. “Centering theory on Greek 
Narratives and Newspaper Articles.” In The World of Texts: A Collection of Articles 
in Honor of G. Babiniotis. 
Karanasios, Giorgos. 1989. “Kenes katigories ke sintaktiko ipokimeno sta Elinika 
(Empty categories and syntactic subject in Greek).” In Studies in Greek Linguistics. 
Proceedings of the 10th annual meeting of the Department of Linguistics: 169-185. 
University of Thessaloniki. 
Kempson, Ruth. 1984. “Pragmatics, anaphora and logical form”. In Meaning, form and 
use in context: linguistic applications, Schiffrin, D. (ed), 1-10. Washington DC: 
Georgetown University Press. 
Kempson, Ruth. 1988a. “Grammar and conversational principle.” In Linguistics: the 
Cambridge survey, Newmeyer, F.J. (ed), Vol 2, 139-163. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Kempson, Ruth. 1988b. “Logical form: the grammar cognition interface.” Journal of 
Linguistics 24: 393-431. 
Kempson, Ruth. (ed.). 1988c. Mental representations: the interface between language 
and reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kiparsky, Paul. 2002. “Disjoint reference and the typology of pronouns.” In More than 
Words, Ingrid, K. and Stiebels, B. (eds), Studia Grammatica 53: 179-226. Berlin: 
Akademie Verlag.  
Koopman, Hilda and Sportiche, Dominique. 1989. “Pronouns, logical variables and 
logophoricity in Abe.” Linguistic Inquiry 20: 555-588. 
Kordoni, Valia. 1995. “Psychological predicates in Modern Greek.” In Greek linguistics 
’95, Drachman, G., Malikouti-Drachman, A., Klidi, C. & Fykias, J. (eds.), 535-544. 
Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Greek linguistics. Graz: W 
Neugebauer Verlag. 
Kuno, Susumu. 1987. Functional Syntax: Anaphora, Discourse and Empathy. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Kuno, Susumu and Kaburaki, Etsuko. 1977. “Empathy and syntax.” Linguistic Inquiry 8: 
627-672.  
Lapata, Maria. 1998. “Anaphoric Binding in Modern Greek”. In Proceedings of the 
LFG98 Conference, CSLI Publications: The University of Queensland, Brisbane. 
[on-line] available from: /www.-csli.Stanford.edu/publications/. 
Performing Anaphora in Modern Greek: A Neo-Gricean Pragmatic Analysis 357 
 
Levinson, Stephen C. 1987. “Pragmatics and the grammar of Anaphora: A partial 
pragmatic reduction of binding and control phenomena.” Journal of Linguistics 23: 
379-434. 
Levinson, Stephen C. 1991. “Pragmatic Reduction of Pragmatic Conditions Revisited.” 
Journal of Linguistics 27: 107-161. 
Levinson, Stephen C. 2000. Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized 
Conversational Implicature. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
Mackridge, Peter. 1985. The Modern Greek Language: A Descriptive Analysis of 
Standard Modern Greek. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Miltsakaki, Eleni. 2002. “Toward an aposynthesis of topic continuity and intrasentential 
anaphora.” Computational Linguistics 28 (3): 319-355. 
Mittwoch, Anita. 1983.” Backward anaphora and discourse structure.”  Journal of 
Pragmatics 7: 129-139. 
Philippaki-Warburton, Irene. 1987. “The theory of empty categories and the pro-drop 
parameter in Modern Greek.” Journal of Linguistics 23: 289-318. 
Philippaki-Warburton, Irene and Catsimali, Georgia. 1999. “On Control in Greek.” In 
Studies in Greek Syntax, Alexiadou, A. Horrocks, G. and Stavrou, M. (eds.), 153-
168. 
Runner, Jeffrey T, Sussman, Rachel S and Tanenhaus, Michael K. 2003. “Assignment of 
reference to reflexives and pronouns in picture noun phrases: Evidence from eye 
movements.” Cognition 89: B1-B13.  
Reinhart, Tania. 1983.  Anaphora and Semantic Interpretation. London: Croom Helm. 
Reinhart, Tania. and Reunald, Eric. 1993. “Reflexivity.” Linguistic Inquiry 24: 657-720.  
Sells, Peter. 1987. “Aspects of logophoricity.” Linguistic Inquiry 18: 445-479. 
Terzi, Arhonto. 1991. “PRO and Obviation in Modern Greek Subjunctives.” In 
Proceedings of WCCFL 10: 471-482 
Terzi, Arhonto. 1993. “PRO and Null Case in Finite Clauses.” Unpublished manuscript, 
University of Ottawa. 
Valiouli, Maria. 1994. “Anaphora, agreement and right dislocations in Greek.” Journal 
of Semantics 11: 55-82. 
Varlokosta, Spyridoula. 1993. “Control in Modern Greek.” University of Maryland 
Working Papers in Linguistics 1: 144-163. 
Varlokosta, Spyridoula. 1994. Issues on Modern Greek sentential complementation. 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Meryland, College Park. 
Varlokosta, Spyridoula and Hornstein, Norbert. 1993. “A Bound Pronoun in Modern 
Greek.” Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 11: 175-195. 
Zribi-Hertz, Anne. 1989. “Anaphor binding and narrative point of view: English 
reflexive pronouns in sentence and discourse.” Language 65: 695-727. 
Zribi-Hertz, Anne. 1995. “Emphatic or Reflexive? On the Endophoric character of 
French lui-même and similar complex pronouns.” Journal of Linguistics 31: 333-
374.  
 
 
About the author 
 
Michael Chiou holds a PhD from the University of Reading titled ‘NP-anaphora in Modern 
Greek: A neo-Gricean pragmatic approach’. He has also received an MA in Linguistic 
358 Michael Chiou 
 
Science (Reading) and a BA in English Language, Linguistics and Literature (Athens). His 
main research interests are in pragmatics, semantics and syntax focusing on the pragmatics and 
its interfaces. In his thesis, he proposes that NP-anaphora patterns in Modern Greek can be 
partially accounted for by the employment of a pragmatic apparatus formulated upon the 
Levinsonian neo-Gricean pragmatic principles. He has taught syntax and pragmatics in the 
University of Hertfordshire and he supervises for the Li2 ‘Meanings’ Linguistics Tripos at the 
University of Cambridge. His work has been presented in conferences across Europe. 
